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I. INTRODUCTION 
“If Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because they 
have been convicted of theft then, they should stop stealing.”1  This 
alarming statement was made in 1989 by a Florida court in rejecting a 
Title VII disparate impact claim involving the use of criminal records in 
hiring decisions.2  It illustrates the difficulty facing plaintiffs who wish to 
use federal anti-discrimination laws to challenge criminal records 
policies that prevent them from finding adequate employment. 
The employment prospects facing ex-offenders are bleak.3  
According to a 2000 study, 60% of those released from prison were 
unable to find employment within a year of their release.4  Some of this 
is caused by characteristics apart from their criminal histories.5  Those 
who have been incarcerated tend to have less education and work 
experience, fewer cognitive skills, and greater instances of substance 
abuse and other physical and mental health issues when compared with 
the rest of the population.6 
 
1.  EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 1989).  
2.  Id. at 754. 
3.  Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, Economic, and 
Social Consequences, SENT’G & CORRECTIONS (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C.), 
Nov. 2000, at 3. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Employment Barriers Facing 
Ex-Offenders, 4–5 (Urban Institute Reentry Roundtable Discussion Paper, 2003). 
6.  Id.  Holzer et al. note that approximately “70% of offenders and ex-offenders are 
high school dropouts” and “about half are ‘functionally illiterate.’”  Id. at 5 (quoting JEREMY 
TRAVIS, AMY L. SOLOMON & MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE 
DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 12 (2001)) (citing AMY HIRSCH 
ET AL., EVERY DOOR CLOSED: BARRIERS FACING PARENTS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 86 
(2002)); Richard B. Freeman, Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged Youths, in 
URBAN LABOR MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY 201, 201 (George E. Peterson & Wayne 
Vroman eds., 1992)).  About three-fourths suffer from substance abuse problems.  Holzer et 
al., supra note 5, at 5. 
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But beyond these factors, ex-offenders face the added burden of 
discrimination that is based solely on their status as ex-offenders.7  
While it may make sense for employers to prefer employees without 
criminal records over ex-offenders,8 the result is a largely permanent 
underclass of citizens who are unable to ever fully reintegrate into 
society despite the fact that they have fulfilled the punishments meted 
out to them by the criminal justice system.9  Given that nearly half of ex-
offenders are African-American and nearly one-fifth are Latino or 
Asian,10 this underclass is largely made up of minorities. 
Currently, there is no federal anti-discrimination law aimed at 
protecting ex-offenders.  However, because of the number of minorities 
affected by such discrimination,11 efforts have been made to use the 
disparate impact theory of discrimination available under Title VII as a 
remedy.  In this Article, I analyze both the effectiveness and desirability 
of using disparate impact theory as a way to reduce employment 
discrimination against ex-offenders.  In particular, I argue that disparate 
impact theory is neither the panacea nor the lost cause that some other 
commentators have argued.12  Instead, I argue that there are particular 
types of criminal-records-bar cases in which disparate impact theory 
remains quite viable.  However, I further argue that, outside of this 
limited scope, pursuing such cases not only will result in predictable 
failure for the individual case, but also risks de-legitimizing disparate 
impact theory for those criminal records discrimination cases to which 
the courts are amenable. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions and particularly the burdensome 
employment situation facing ex-offenders.  Part III provides a brief 
overview of disparate impact theory and discusses the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s new enforcement guidelines on 
the use of arrest and conviction records in employment.  Part IV 
analyzes how disparate impact theory has been applied in cases in which 
applicants were barred from employment or fired due to their criminal 
 
7.  See Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 11 (“Over 90% of employers surveyed are willing to 
consider filling their most recent job vacancy with a welfare recipient, while only about 40% 
are willing to consider doing so with an ex-offender.”). 
8.  Id. 
9.  See Freeman, supra note 6, at 201. 
10.  Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 5. 
11.  Id. 
12.  See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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records.  In doing so, it counters one of the main critiques leveled at the 
use of disparate impact theory in these cases, namely that the courts are 
inherently hostile to them.  Part V discusses and counters other critiques 
that have been leveled against the use of disparate impact theory in 
these cases.  Finally, Part VI provides an evaluation of which categories 
of cases are most likely to succeed and fail.  I argue that, rather than 
completely rejecting disparate impact theory in criminal records cases, 
most courts have drawn boundaries that, while perhaps less forgiving 
than advocates would like, leave open the possibility for challenging 
specific types of criminal records policies.  However, I also note some 
risks associated with pursuing such cases.  This Article concludes that 
advocates should continue to pursue disparate impact challenges to 
criminal records policies only in certain, well-defined categories of cases. 
II. THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTIONS 
A. Collateral Consequences Generally 
Assisting those with criminal records to reintegrate into society has 
been recognized as a major public policy problem in recent years.13  
Contrary to the myth that once criminals “pay their debt to society” 
they can start afresh, criminal records typically follow individuals 
around for the rest of their lives, essentially ensuring that all but the 
lucky few will remain on the margins of society.14  In an age in which 
access to criminal records is cheap, easy, and widespread15 and the legal 
 
13.  See 150 CONG. REC. 1, 38 (2004).  In his 2004 State of the Union Address, former 
President George W. Bush announced the Prisoner Re-Entry Initiative noting, “America is 
the land of the second chance—and when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should 
lead to a better life.”  Id. 
14.  Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., & Black, Douglas & 
Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (“Conviction of a felony imposes a status upon a person which not 
only makes him vulnerable to future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which 
also seriously affects his reputation and economic opportunities.”); see also supra notes 8–9 
and accompanying text. 
15.  Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 9 (“In its most recent review of state privacy and 
security legislation, the U.S. Department of Justice concludes that criminal history record 
information is increasingly becoming more available to non-criminal justice users, although 
the degree of openness varies from state to state.”) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF STATE PRIVACY AND SECURITY LEGISLATION: 
1999 OVERVIEW 8–12 (2000)).  Additionally, the use of criminal background checks by 
employers is growing.  In 1996, 51% of employers conducted criminal background checks.  
Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment 
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231, 237 (2012).  By 2010, 
that percentage had risen to 92%.  Id. 
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system imposes countless restrictions on those with criminal pasts long 
after they have “served their time,”16 the truth is that the slate is never 
truly clean.  
This is no small problem.  Today, the United States has the highest 
incarceration rate in the world.17  Estimates indicate that some 3.4% of 
Americans will spend time in prison at some point in their lives.18  
Approximately 19.8 million, or 8.6% of the adult population, have been 
convicted of a felony,19 and each year, more than 650,000 prisoners are 
released from penal institutions.20  But one need not have been 
incarcerated to attain a black mark on his or her record.  Indeed, a 
staggering 65 million Americans, or over one in four adults, have a 
criminal record of some kind.21 
The consequences of a criminal conviction are, in many cases, 
devastating.22  Beyond the stigma of having a criminal record, there are 
a multitude of “collateral consequences”—those consequences and 
 
16.  See infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
17.  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6 (rev. ed. 2012).  For every 100,000 people, approximately 750 
are in prison.  Id. 
18.  Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population, 
1948 to 2010, at 11–12 (Apr. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at Population 
Association of America 2011 Annual Meeting Program), available at http://paa2011.princeton
.edu/papers/111687, archived at http://perma.cc/WS8Y-8RCC. 
19.  Id. at 12. 
20.  Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/arc
hive/fbci/progmenu_reentry.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SQ2N-NJKA. 
Recent studies estimate more than 700,000 individuals annually leave the prisons of 
our state and federal governments and return home.  That is a little over 1,900 a day.  
That is just over four times the number of people who made similar journeys from 
prison to home a short twenty years ago. 
Michael L. Foreman, Professor, Dir. of Civil Rights Appellate Clinic, Statement at EEOC 
Meeting: Employment Discrimination Faced by Individuals with Arrest and Conviction 
Records (Nov. 20, 2008).  
21.  MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 3 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-
/SCLP/2011/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf?nocdn=1, archived at http://perma.cc/GZ2H-
ZBC2. 
22.  Lahny R. Silva, In Search of a Second Chance: Channeling BMW v. Gore and 
Reconsidering Occupational Licensing Restrictions, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 495, 499 (2012) 
(“Today there are approximately 38,000 statutory and regulatory disqualifications triggered 
solely by the fact of prior felony conviction.  This amounts to an average of 700 per 
jurisdiction, and it is estimated that 65% of these are employment related.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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penalties a person faces beyond what is meted out as punishment for the 
crime committed.23  Depending on the nature of the conviction, an ex-
convict may face restrictions in access to or be excluded all together 
from a myriad of public benefits such as housing,24 social welfare 
programs,25 and student loans.26  Such exclusions are also widespread in 
private markets,27 and one might even face substantial difficulties on the 
basis of mere arrests that did not result in convictions.28 
B. Particular Employment Consequences 
Perhaps the most devastating collateral consequence faced by those 
with criminal records is lower levels of employment.29  In many cases, 
employment discrimination against those with criminal records is not 
only sanctioned but actually mandated by the state.30  For example, 
several states prohibit ex-felons from all public employment.31  Many 
also restrict certain ex-offenders from obtaining a wide variety of 
occupational licenses.32  
 
23.  Margaret E. Finzen, Note, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of 
Incarceration and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
299, 30507 (2005). 
24.  Heidi Lee Cain, Comment, Housing Our Criminals: Finding Housing for the Ex-
Offender in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 137–38 (2003). 
25.  Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on 
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 158 (1999). 
26.  See 34 C.F.R. § 668.40 (1999) 
27.  See infra Part II.B. 
28.  See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
29.  Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against 
Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 2–3 (2012).  
Prior to the current recession, between 25% and 40% of ex-offenders were unemployed.  Id. 
at 3. 
30.  Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 8. 
31.  Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of Second 
Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 527, 536 (2006) (“Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and South 
Carolina permanently deny convicted felons the right to public employment.  The other forty-
five states ‘permit public employment of convicted felons in varying degrees.’” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Kathleen M. Olivares, Velmer S. Burton, Jr. & Francis T. Cullen, The 
Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 
Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10, 13 (1996))). 
32.  Id. (“Some states also impose or allow restrictions on hiring or licensing ex-
offenders or parolees for particular professions (e.g., law, real estate, medicine, dentistry, 
engineering, pharmacy, nursing, physical therapy, and education).  Many states further 
decrease ex-offenders’ employment prospects through occupational licensing laws that 
contain character requirements that either bear no direct relation to the licensed occupation 
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Even when discrimination is not mandated, ex-offenders face 
daunting odds when looking for employment.  Huge numbers of 
employers conduct criminal background checks,33 and many have 
expressed an unwillingness to hire employees with any sort of criminal 
record.34  This is typically a record of convictions but could include a 
record of arrests as well.35  
According to one study, a criminal record reduces the likelihood of a 
callback or employment offer by nearly 50%.36  Only a fraction of ex-
offenders are able to find jobs paying a living wage,37 and those who 
have committed violent crimes may find it nearly impossible to find 
work.38  The prospects of ex-offenders are only expected to get worse as 
background checks become more ubiquitous.39 
Employers often have good reasons for imposing these restrictions.  
First, they may have legitimate reasons to be worried about liability.40  
Next, some criminal convictions are so related to the job in question that 
it would be bad policy to require employers to ignore them.41  A recent 
 
or that do not consider the individual circumstances of the crime for which the applicant was 
convicted.” (footnotes omitted)). 
33.  See Concepción, supra note 15, at 237.  
34.  Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Will Employers Hire 
Ex-Offenders? Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants 7 (Inst. 
For Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 1243-02, 2002), available at http://www.irp.wis
c.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp124302.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CP99-RCYE. 
35.  See, e.g., Clinkscale v. City of Phila., No. 97-2165, 1998 WL 372138 (E.D. Pa. June 
16, 1998) (order granting summary judgment) (holding that a police department’s policy of 
excluding applicants with any type of criminal history, including arrests without convictions, 
did not violate Title VII); see also Archer & Williams, supra note 31, at 537 (“While some 
may see the benefit of allowing employers to discriminate against convicted felons, it is 
especially difficult to rationalize such discrimination on the basis of an arrest that did not even 
result in a conviction.  Yet, this happens in a majority of states: ‘Thirty-eight states permit all 
employers (public and private) and occupational licensing agencies to inquire about and rely 
upon arrests that did not result in a conviction.’  Arkansas, New Hampshire, and New Mexico 
forbid public employers to rely on arrests that did not lead to conviction, but permit private 
employers to do so.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Debbie A. Mukamal & Paul N. Samuels, 
Statutory Limitations on Civil Rights of People with Criminal Records, 30 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1501, 1503–04 (2003))). 
36.  Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 955–56 (2003).  
37.  See Harwin, supra note 29, at 3; Petersilia, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
38.  Harwin, supra note 29 at 4 (“[O]ver ninety percent of employers turn away 
applicants who report a history of violent crime.”). 
39.  Id. at 3. 
40.  See infra Part V.D (discussing negligent hiring liability). 
41.  Archer & Williams, supra note 31, at 536 (“Some employment restrictions are 
grounded in concerns for public safety, and may therefore be appropriate.  As one 
commentator noted: ‘[I]t is clear why persons convicted of child molestation are not 
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study conducted by the Society for Human Resource Management 
revealed several reasons employers cite for why they are hesitant to hire 
ex-offenders.42  Those reasons include the following: a general worry 
about having employees who are criminals, fear of liability for harm to 
co-workers or customers, fear of financial liability through theft, and the 
fact that a conviction is a general sign that the person in question lacks 
skills or trustworthiness.43  Such concerns exist in spite of the fact that 
there is no research indicating that a person’s criminal record, in and of 
itself, is indicative of poor performance on the job.44  Although, 
generally speaking, those who have committed a crime in the past have 
a high risk of doing so in the future,45 such statements leave out such 
factors as the role of unemployment itself in creating such recidivism 
and the lessened risk with the passage of time.46  Indeed, studies show 
that, over time, people with criminal records have the same risk of 
committing further crimes as those with no records.47  When the fact that 
 
permitted to work in day care centers.’” (quoting Marc Mauer, Introduction: The Collateral 
Consequences of Imprisonment, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1491, 1493 (2003))).  However, 
Archer and Williams also discuss how some restrictions seem more retributive than anything 
else.  Id. at 536–37 (“A wide range of jobs include restrictions that bear no reasonable 
relationship to the job function or a public safety concern.  For example, depending on the 
nature of the conviction, New York may deny ex-felons employment in more than one 
hundred trades and professions, including barbering, plumbing, real estate, education, health 
care, and private security.  In Virginia, individuals convicted of a felony may not work as 
nurses, funeral directors, pharmacists, optometrists, accountants, or dentists.  And in 
Maryland, state agencies and licensing boards have discretion to deny or revoke a wide range 
of professional licenses, including those for barbers, insurance professionals, accountants, 
landscape architects, plumbers, and social workers.” (footnotes omitted)).  
42.  SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS 7 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/research/surve
yfindings/articles/pages/backgroundcheckcriminalchecks.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/5M
4L-LN35. 
43.  See Harry J. Holzer, Collateral Costs: The Effects of Incarceration on the 
Employment and Earnings of Young Workers 8 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), 
Discussion Paper No. 3118, 2007); see also SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGT., supra note 42. 
44.  Stacy A. Hickox & Mark V. Roehling, Negative Credentials: Fair and Effective 
Consideration of Criminal Records, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 201–08 (2013) (indicating that there 
was “surprisingly little research” in this area and that the authors were able to identify only 
one relevant study, which showed no link between having a criminal record at ages thirteen to 
sixteen and engaging in negative work behaviors at age twenty-six). 
45.  See id. at 206.  See generally Recidivism, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/in
dex.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17#data_collections (last visited Jan. 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc
/NME9-M446. 
46.  See Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking “Rational Discrimination” Against Ex-Offenders, 
13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 283, 284 (2006). 
47.  Hickox & Roehling, supra note 44, at 206; see Megan Kurlychek, Robert Brame & 
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most crimes do not occur in the workplace is taken into account, the 
risks are even lower.48 
Given the role of unemployment in recidivism, such discrimination 
has devastating consequences not only for ex-offenders but for society 
as a whole.49  Offenders who are unable to obtain employment are far 
more likely to engage in criminal behavior again.50  Furthermore, the 
inability of ex-offenders to find work disproportionately affects black 
and Hispanic men, who are represented in the prison population at 
higher rates than any other group.51  Projections indicate that one-third 
of black men and one-sixth of Hispanic men will be incarcerated during 
their lifetimes52—arrests or convictions are even higher.53  Furthermore, 
at least one study shows that a criminal record is more likely to prevent 
African-Americans than whites from obtaining jobs.54 
III. DISPARATE IMPACT CHALLENGES TO CRIMINAL RECORDS 
EXCLUSION POLICIES 
As stated previously, currently, there is no federal law directly 
prohibiting employment discrimination against ex-offenders.  However, 
the disproportionate effect on certain minority groups indicates that 
Title VII may be used to alleviate some of this discrimination.   
Title VII provides two opportunities for challenging policies that bar 
ex-offenders from employment: disparate treatment and disparate 
 
Shawn D. Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict 
Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 493–94 (2006) (finding that eighteen-
year-olds with conviction records were about as likely to be arrested as those without criminal 
records after six to seven years without contact with the criminal justice system). 
48.  Hickox & Roehling, supra note 44, at 207.  
49.  See Simonson, supra note 46, at 284; see also Archer & Williams, supra note 31, at 
530–31.  
50.  Simonson, supra note 46, at 284. 
51.  Id.  Approximately two-thirds of inmates in the United States are African-American 
or Latino.  Id. 
52.  Harwin, supra note 29, at 4.  In some communities, the rates are even higher.  In 
Washington, D.C., for example, the estimate is an astounding three-fourths of black men.  
ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 6–7. 
53.  Harwin, supra note 29, at 4. 
54.  Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 
617, 644–645 (describing the results of a study in which black and white testers with equal 
qualifications but varying criminal records applied for low-level jobs).  “Among blacks 
without criminal records, only 14% received callbacks relative to 34% of white noncriminals 
(p<.01).  In fact, even whites with criminal records received more favorable treatment (17%) 
than blacks without criminal records (14%).”  Id. 
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impact.55  Disparate treatment claims allege that a member of a 
protected class is being treated unfavorably as compared to others.56  
Such a claim might be available if a plaintiff could prove that minority 
ex-offenders were being treated differently than non-minority ex-
offenders. 
In this Article, I focus on the other possible Title VII challenge—
disparate impact.  Unlike disparate treatment claims, disparate impact 
claims need not allege intentional discrimination; no discriminatory 
purpose is required.57  Rather, a claim for disparate impact arises when a 
facially neutral policy has a discriminatory effect.58  Once a plaintiff has 
proven that the policy has a discriminatory effect, an employer has the 
burden to show that the policy is “job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity.”59  The plaintiff may 
then rebut this defense if he or she can show that another, less 
discriminatory policy that is available to the employer would equally 
fulfill the business necessity.60 
Due to the disproportionately large number of ex-offenders who are 
minorities,61 disparate impact theory provides an opportunity for 
challenging policies that discriminate against ex-offenders in hiring and 
retention.  Although such policies are neutral on their face, in effect, 
they operate to exclude far more minorities, particularly black and 
Hispanic men, from employment opportunities. 
A. The New EEOC Enforcement Guidelines 
The EEOC has long recognized that discriminating against ex-
offenders disproportionately affects minorities.62  To that end, on April 
 
55.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-3 (2012). 
56.  See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
57.  See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
58.  See id.  
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C). 
61.  See Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 5; see also Simonson, supra note 46, at 284. 
62.  For example, in a 1987 policy statement, the EEOC stated, “[T]he Commission’s 
underlying position [is] that an employer’s policy or practice of excluding individuals from 
employment on the basis of their conviction records has an adverse impact on Blacks and 
Hispanics in light of statistics showing that they are convicted at a rate disproportionately 
greater than their representation in the population.”  U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, EEOC POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER 
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED, 42 U.S.C. § 2000E ET SEQ. 
(1982) (1987), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html, archived at http://pe
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25, 2012, it issued new guidelines for employers on the use of arrest and 
conviction records in employment decisions.63  The guidelines 
consolidated and updated previous guidelines and call for an 
individualized assessment of candidates with prior convictions.64  They 
advise employers to consider, among other factors, the nature of the 
crime committed, the time that has elapsed since the conviction, and the 
nature of the job in question.65  The EEOC has since filed several 
disparate impact lawsuits aimed at enforcing the guidelines.66 
The EEOC guidelines have elicited strong negative reactions in 
some corners.67  Critics have challenged the authority of the EEOC to 
 
rma.cc/2FSF-8PNQ.  
63.  U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS 
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC 
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LV2W-4KAK. 
The EEOC’s new guidelines are a part of their “E-RACE” (Eradicating Racism and 
Colorism from Employment) initiative.  See The E-RACE Initiative, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/ (last visited Jan. 17, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/B5GH-RPEK.  Among other things, that initiative targets 
for stronger enforcement “facially neutral employment criteria” that are “significantly 
disadvantaging applicants and employees on the basis of race and color.”  Why Do We Need 
E-Race?, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-
race/why_e-race.cfm (last visited Jan. 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LRA6-AY2P. 
64.  EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 18–24. 
65.  Id. at 11.  The complete list of factors is as follows:  
 • The facts or circumstances surrounding the offense or conduct;  
 • The number of offenses for which the individual was convicted;  
 • Older age at the time of conviction, or release from prison;  
 • Evidence that the individual performed the same type of work, post conviction, 
with the same or a different employer, with no known incidents of criminal 
conduct;  
 • The length and consistency of employment history before and after the offense 
or conduct; 
 • Rehabilitation efforts, e.g., education/training;  
 • Employment or character references and any other information regarding 
fitness for the particular position; and  
 • Whether the individual is bonded under a federal, state, or local bonding 
program. 
Id. at 18 (footnotes omitted). 
66.  On June 11, 2013, the EEOC filed suit against Dollar General Corporation and 
BMW alleging that both company policies regarding criminal background checks caused a 
disparate impact against African-Americans.  See Complaint at 1–2, EEOC v. Dolgencorp, 
LLC, No. 13-cv-04307 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013), ECF No. 1; Complaint, EEOC v. BMW Mfg. 
Co. at 1, No. 13-cv-01583 (D.S.C. June 11, 2013), ECF No. 1. 
67.  See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Morrisey, W. Va. Attorney Gen., et al., to Jacqueline 
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enforce the guidelines and the legitimacy of using disparate impact in 
criminal-records-exclusion cases generally.68  While I will address those 
critiques later in this Article, I first want to turn to critiques that, while 
they support the underlying theory, question the wisdom or efficacy of 
using disparate impact theory in these cases. 
IV. CRITIQUES OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY—TREATMENT IN THE 
COURTS 
In spite of some early successes,69 many commentators have noted 
the limits of Title VII in alleviating the problem of employment 
discrimination against ex-offenders.70  Some of these critiques focus on 
the fact that Title VII is not protective enough or is simply ill-suited to 
the issue of ex-offender employment discrimination.71  They also point 
out that because Title VII applies only to those in protected classes, it 
excludes a large number of possible plaintiffs.72  Because ex-offenders 
are not a protected class under Title VII, only those plaintiffs who are 
also members of a protected class may bring suit.73 
These are valid objections, and I address them, as well as others, in 
more detail below.  However, I will first address the most salient line of 
critique, namely, that these cases, for a variety of reasons, have become 
 
A. Berrien, Chair, EEOC, et al. 2 (July 24, 2013) [hereinafter Morrisey et al.], available at 
https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/EEOC-Letter-Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/LZ
5L-HFRP (arguing that the EEOC’s new guidelines represent “gross federal overreach”); see 
also, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 803 (D. Md. 2013) (“By bringing actions of 
this nature, the EEOC has placed many employers in the ‘Hobson’s choice’ of ignoring 
criminal history and credit background, thus exposing themselves to potential liability for 
criminal and fraudulent acts committed by employees, on the one hand, or incurring the 
wrath of the EEOC for having utilized information deemed fundamental by most 
employers.”); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 11, 15, 17, Texas v. 
EEOC, 2014 BL 232926 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 13-cv-00255-C) (alleging that the new 
guidelines interfere with state sovereignty). 
68.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 67, at 16–17. 
69.  See, e.g., Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (Gibson, C.J., 
dissenting from Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 
472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972). 
70.  See Harwin, supra note 29, at 5 (calling the focus on disparate impact theory in this 
context “misdirected”); Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the 
Tough on Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment 
Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 27 (2013) (“Title VII is not a viable 
mechanism for restricting criminal-record-related employment discrimination.”). 
71.  See Newell, supra note 70, at 27. 
72.  See infra Part V.C. 
73.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (m) (2012). 
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virtually unwinnable. 
In making such arguments, some critics have argued that disparate 
impact itself may be a dying doctrine.74  I do not dispute such claims 
here but instead focus on whether, given what is left of disparate impact 
theory generally, ex-offender cases are actually as unwinnable as some 
critics have claimed.75  
Given these parameters, the main critique levelled against using 
disparate impact theory in the ex-offender context argues that the courts 
have become hostile to such cases.76  Critics argue that the level of proof 
courts require to prove a prima facie case have become untenable and 
that, simultaneously, their requirements for establishing a legitimate 
business necessity have lowered to the extent that the defense is nearly 
impossible to overcome.77 
There is certainly some evidence of hostility on the part of the 
courts.  In particular, the opinions in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers 
Corp.,78 and, much more recently, EEOC v. Freeman,79 both discussed in 
further detail below, are dripping with sarcasm and a sense almost of 
disbelief that the plaintiffs brought their suits.80  Still, a few isolated 
cases do not evidence a general trend.  In fact, a closer look at cases 
even in which plaintiffs have lost shows not so much a hostility toward 
the use of disparate impact in criminal records cases as a natural desire 
to balance the problem of employment discrimination against ex-
offenders with the very real need of employers to have freedom in 
 
74.  See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a 
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 138 
(2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1231 (1995); 
Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2010); Amy 
L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 624–25 (2011).  For an 
overview of a variety of critiques that have been leveled against disparate impact theory, see 
Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 911, 968–84 (2005). 
75.  See, e.g., Michael Connett, Comment, Employer Discrimination Against Individuals 
with a Criminal Record: The Unfulfilled Role of State Fair Employment Agencies, 83 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1007, 1031–32 (2011); Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and 
Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 315, 318 (1998); Simonson, supra note 46, at 286. 
76. See Connett, supra note 75, at 1031–32; Lye, supra note 75, at 344–47. 
77.  Lye, supra note 75, at 344–47. 
78.  723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla 1989). 
79.  961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013). 
80.  See id.; Carolina Freight, 723 F. Supp. 734. 
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determining who will make the best employees and to avoid liability for 
choosing the wrong ones.81  To more clearly understand what is going 
on, it is necessary to take a closer look at some of the cases that have 
analyzed this issue in detail. 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the use of criminal 
records exclusions.  However, two cases in which it touched on the issue 
peripherally prove instructive when examining how other courts have 
addressed the issue. 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,82 the Court held that an 
employer’s refusal to rehire an employee who had engaged in illegal 
activity against the employer was not a violation of Title VII.83  
However, in doing so, the Court specifically noted that McDonnell 
Douglas was not excluding the plaintiff “through some sweeping 
disqualification of all those with any past record of unlawful behavior, 
however remote, insubstantial, or unrelated to applicant’s personal 
qualifications as an employee.”84  The latter caveat seems to imply that 
such a sweeping qualification would be suspect. 
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,85 the Court upheld a 
transportation agency’s policy of refusing to hire anyone who was 
currently using methadone, a drug used to treat addiction to illegal 
drugs, especially heroin.86  In that case, the Court relied on the “safety 
sensitive” nature of the positions and held, without a great deal of 
analysis, that the policy served the “legitimate employment goals of 
safety and efficiency.”87  Beazer indicates a willingness to grant 
employers greater deference in their business necessity defenses when 
the business necessity at issue is public safety.88 
As will be shown, these two principles—a suspicion of overly broad 
exclusionary policies and deference to public safety concerns—color, to 
a greater or lesser extent, nearly all criminal-records-exclusion cases.  
When the employer can reasonably assert a business necessity related to 
public safety, the employer will virtually always win, regardless of how 
 
81.  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973); El v. Se. Pa. 
Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007). 
82.  411 U.S. 792. 
83.  See id. at 804–07. 
84.  Id. at 806. 
85.  440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
86.  Id. at 573, 594. 
87.  Id. at 587 n.31. 
88.  See id. at 592. 
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broad the exclusion is.89  Without the public safety assertion, broad 
exclusionary policies will often, although not always, fall.90  The murkier 
cases, and the ones most likely to show evidence of hostility, are those 
that fall somewhere in between: narrower policies that do not involve 
public safety.91  
In this section, I illustrate examples of each of these types of cases in 
turn.  I treat the last case that I discuss, El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority (SEPTA),92 separately because, as will be 
shown, that case signals a possible step away from the current paradigm 
and offers a glimmer of hope for how disparate impact theory might be 
used to offer broader protection to minority men with criminal 
records.93 
A. Broad Exclusionary Policies  
Given the EEOC’s particular distaste for broad exclusionary policies 
as well as the oft-stated principle that Title VII protects individuals, not 
classes, employers who maintain such policies without also offering a 
compelling public safety justification would seem the most vulnerable to 
attack.94  Nonetheless, while several important cases indicate that, as a 
general rule, this is true, there are some exceptions. 
1. Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. 
Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. (MoPac)95 probably remains 
the most important case to have held that criminal records exclusionary 
policies have a disparate impact on minority men.96  Indeed, the 
EEOC’s enforcement guidelines rely heavily on the reasoning and 
principles enunciated in Green.97 
In Green, the court held that MoPac’s policy of denying employment 
to anyone who had been convicted of any crime other than a minor 
traffic offense had a disparate impact on minorities.98  Green was a black 
 
89.  See infra Part IV.B. 
90.  See infra Part IV.A. 
91.  See infra Part IV.C. 
92.  479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007). 
93.  See infra Part IV.D. 
94.  See El, 479 F.3d at 243. 
95.  523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). 
96.  Id. at 1298–99. 
97.  EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 17–18. 
98.  Green, 523 F.2d at 1298–99. 
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male who had been convicted in 1967 for refusing military induction, for 
which he served twenty-one months in prison.99  He disclosed his prior 
conviction when he applied for a position as a clerk with MoPac in 
1970.100  
The court found that from September 1, 1971, through November 7, 
1973, 3,282 blacks and 5,206 whites had applied for positions at 
MoPac.101  Of these applicants, 174 blacks, or 5.3%, were rejected due to 
conviction records compared to 118 whites, or 2.23%.102  The court 
found that this was enough to show a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.103 
The court then held that MoPac did not meet the requirements of 
the business necessity test.104  MoPac offered the following justifications: 
“1) [F]ear of cargo theft, 2) handling company funds, 3) bonding 
qualifications, 4) possible impeachment of an employee as a witness, 5) 
possible liability for hiring persons with known violent tendencies, 6) 
employment disruption caused by recidivism, and 7) alleged lack of 
moral character of persons with convictions.”105  The court rejected 
these justifications because MoPac did not empirically validate them or 
show that “a less restrictive alternative with a lesser racial impact would 
not serve as well.”106  The court found that, while MoPac’s proffered 
justifications were relevant, they did not justify an absolute bar.107 
In explaining its holding, the Green court noted that it interpreted 
the Supreme Court’s qualification in McDonnell Douglas that the 
plaintiff in that case could be fairly barred because he had engaged in 
illegal activity directly aimed at his employer “to suggest that a sweeping 
disqualification for employment resting solely on past behavior can 
violate Title VII where that employment practice has a disproportionate 
racial impact and rests upon a tenuous or insubstantial basis.”108  In 
probably its most powerful statement against the use of broad 
exclusionary policies, the court stated: 
 
99.  Id. at 1292–93. 
100.  Id. at 1292. 
101.  Id. at 1294. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. at 1295. 
104.  Id. at 1298. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. at 1296. 
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We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would 
automatically place every individual convicted of any offense, 
except a minor traffic offense, in the permanent ranks of the 
unemployed.  This is particularly true for blacks who have 
suffered and still suffer from the burdens of discrimination in our 
society.  To deny job opportunities to these individuals because 
of some conduct which may be remote in time or does not 
significantly bear upon the particular job requirements is an 
unnecessarily harsh and unjust burden.109 
Importantly, in discussing a prior district court case, the court 
seemed to endorse some tailoring measures that would allow employers 
to bar certain ex-offenders without running afoul of Title VII.110  In 
particular, the court discussed the desirability of examining the nature 
and seriousness of prior crimes, as well as their relationship to the job in 
question; the time that has elapsed since the conviction; the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime; and the 
criminal’s degree of rehabilitation.111  These factors form the basis for 
the EEOC’s guidelines in providing individualized consideration of 
given applicants.112  
2. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.   
Although Green is considered the seminal case on the application of 
disparate impact theory to the use of criminal records exclusionary 
policies, the earliest example at the appellate level in which a court 
addressed the racially discriminatory effects of such policies occurred a 
few years earlier in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.113  In Gregory, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California’s decision that a bright-line rule barring those with 
arrest records from employment violated Title VII.114  In its opinion, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had “correctly anticipated the 
subsequent decision” in Griggs115 “[i]n deciding that statistics 
demonstrated the racially discriminatory character” of Litton’s criminal 
 
109.  Id. at 1298. 
110.  Id. at 1297 (citing Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 578–81 (S.D. Iowa 1974)). 
111.  Id. at 1297. 
112.  EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 18. 
113.  472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). 
114.  Id. at 632. 
115.  Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). 
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records policy.116 
Earl Gregory had been denied employment as a sheet-metal worker 
by Litton Systems because he had been arrested fourteen times.117  
Litton required each applicant to reveal his or her arrest record on an 
employment questionnaire.118  The Ninth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s finding “that the apparently racially-neutral questionnaire 
actually operated to bar employment to black applicants in far greater 
proportion than to white applicants.”119  The Ninth Circuit further 
upheld the district court’s finding that Litton had presented no 
legitimate business necessity for inquiring into the arrest records of 
prospective employees.120 
While the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is relatively short, the district 
court’s opinion provides more information about the underlying 
rationale for the decision.  That court noted that “[t]here is no evidence 
to support a claim that persons who have suffered no criminal 
convictions but have been arrested on a number of occasions can be 
expected, when employed, to perform less efficiently or less honestly 
than other employees.”121  The district court found that African-
Americans are arrested at higher rates than whites, so policies barring 
employment to those with arrest records have a disparate impact on 
African-Americans.122 
Importantly, the court did not discuss Litton’s claimed business 
necessity for the policy123 but instead stated simply that the 
discrimination was “not excused or justified by any business 
necessity.”124  The court did note, however, that “[t]he decision to 
withdraw the offer of employment was in no way predicated on any 
national security clearance regulations,”125 indicating that such national 
security concerns, if sufficiently job-related, could have justified the 
 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id.  
120.  Id. 
121.  Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 402 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
122.  Id. at 403. 
123.  This may be explained by the fact that the district court’s opinion was handed 
down prior to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which is the seminal disparate 
impact case.  Thus, the burden-shifting framework in disparate impact cases would not have 
been established at the time of the district court’s decision. 
124.  Gregory, 316 F. Supp. at 403. 
125.  Id. at 402. 
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policy.  This is an important caveat to the Litton decision because it 
foreshadows later courts’ easy acceptance of proffered business 
necessities in situations that involve public safety.126 
3. Waldon v. Cincinnati Public Schools 
A major triumph for those who support the use of disparate impact 
theory in criminal records cases occurred just last year in Waldon v. 
Cincinnati Public Schools.127  In this case, the State of Ohio had enacted 
legislation in 2007 requiring “criminal background checks of current 
school employees, even those whose duties did not involve the care, 
custody, or control of children.”128  Employees convicted of certain 
crimes were to be terminated, regardless of the time period passed since 
the conviction or the relationship to the employee’s present 
qualifications.129 
In 2008, Gregory Waldon and Eartha Britton, both African-
American, were fired pursuant to the new law.130  The defendant had 
fired ten employees; nine were African-American.131  Waldon and 
Britton filed suit, and the school district filed a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim.132  The school district argued that it was merely 
complying with a state mandate, which was a business necessity.133  The 
plaintiffs argued that Title VII “trump[ed] state law.”134 
The court found that there was “no question that the Plaintiff’s ha[d] 
adequately plead a case of disparate impact.”135  Importantly, the court 
also rejected the defendant’s argument that Title VII only trumped state 
laws that had a discriminatory intent.136  The court said that the case was 
a “close call” and noted that if it had been based on “serious recent 
crimes,” the policy would likely be valid due to the “employees’ 
proximity to children.”137  However, the court found in this case that the 
 
126.  See infra Part IV.B. 
127.  941 F. Supp. 2d 884 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 
128.  Id. at 886. 
129.  Id. 
130.  Id. at 886 & n.1. 
131.  Id. at 886. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. at 887. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. at 888. 
136.  Id.  
137.  Id. at 889. 
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plaintiffs’ “offenses were remote in time,” that Britton’s was 
“insubstantial,” and that “both had demonstrated decades of good 
performance.”138 
The Waldon case is important in showing the promise of disparate 
impact theory in criminal records cases in a number of respects.  First, 
the court accepted, virtually without question, that criminal records bans 
have a disparate impact on African-Americans.139  Second, the court 
rejected a business necessity defense that seemed particularly strong—
the upholding of state law—reaffirming that Title VII trumps state 
law.140  Finally, although the business necessity proffered in this case was 
not public safety but compliance with state law, the court’s willingness to 
overturn a criminal records ban in a case that involves jobs with 
“proximity to children” indicates a skepticism towards claims of business 
necessity that rely on general claims about “safety” when the crimes in 
question are remote in time.141  This latter rejection is particularly 
important given the amorphous nature of safety claims and the difficulty 
of disproving them.  
4. Williams v. Carson Pirie Scott 
Williams v. Carson Pirie Scott142 provides an example of a case in 
which a broad exclusion, here a policy excluding ex-felons from 
employment, was upheld even when the job in question had no public 
safety element.143  Williams was fired from his job as a collector with 
Carson Pirie Scott after disclosing that he was an ex-felon.144  The court 
assumed that Carson Pirie Scott’s policy had a disparate impact but said 
the “purpose of minimizing the perceived risk of employee dishonesty” 
was legitimate.145  In fact, the court performed very little analysis of 
Carson Pirie Scott’s justification, noting, “[T]here is no basis whatever 
for drawing a rational inference that the absence of a felony record is 
 
138.  Id.  Waldon had been found guilty of felonious assault in 1977 and served two 
years in prison.  Id. at 886 n.1.  He had worked for the school district for just under thirty 
years at the time of termination.  Id.  Britton had been convicted of “acting as a go-between 
in the purchase and sale of $5.00 of marijuana” in 1983.  Id.  She had worked for the school 
district for eighteen years at the time of termination.  Id. 
139.  Id. at 888. 
140.  Id. at 888–90. 
141.  See id. at 888–90. 
142.  No. 92 C 5747, 1992 WL 229849 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992). 
143.  See id. at *2. 
144.  Id. at *1. 
145.  Id. at *2. 
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not ‘job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.’”146 
Carson Pirie Scott may not be a particularly instructive case in terms 
of its legal analysis because of its heavy reliance on the business 
necessity issue as it was laid down in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio,147 which was abrogated on this point by the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.148  Although the case was decided after this abrogation, the court 
questioned whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied because the 
hiring practice had been adopted under Wards Cove.149  While the court 
also stated that it would hold the same even if the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 applied,150 its almost unquestioning acceptance of the defendant’s 
proffered business justification as well as the closeness in time of the 
case to the adoption of the Act makes it unlikely that it was really 
conducting a thorough analysis of that issue.  In fact, the court simply 
stated, “[B]oth intuitively and as a matter of law it is obvious that an 
employment policy that bars the hiring of ex-felons—at least for a job as 
‘collector,’ the position for which Williams applied and was originally 
hired—does not violate Title VII.”151 
Nonetheless, this case does provide some instruction on the issue of 
whether courts are inherently hostile to criminal records exclusionary 
policy claims.  In a footnote, the court said:  
This Court has long shared the view that one major tool in the 
effort to reduce recidivism is the provision of employment 
opportunities for the ex-offender seeking to return to society. . . .  
But neither Title VII nor any other provision of positive law 
authorizes this Court to impose its own notions of sound policy 
on employers on pain of their being subjected to liability in case 
of their noncompliance with such notions.152 
 
146.  Id. at *2–3. 
147.  490 U.S. 642 (1989).  The Court in Wards Cove had substantially lightened the 
burden on employers seeking to assert business necessity defenses.  See id. at 659.  Under 
Wards Cove, the employer had only a burden of production, rather than persuasion, and 
needed only to show that a given practice had a substantial justification rather than being 
“essential” or “indispensable” to the business.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148.  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012)). 
149.  Williams, No. 92 C 5747, 1992 WL 229849, at *3. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. at *1. 
152.  Id. at *3 n.3. 
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This footnote indicates not hostility but a genuine, if perhaps overly 
generous in this case, concern for maintaining independence in business 
judgments. 
B. Public Safety as a Business Necessity 
The three cases discussed in this section illustrate how easy it is for 
employers to win cases when they can reasonably proffer a business 
necessity defense that is based in public safety.  As may be expected, the 
employers in each of these cases represent quintessential public safety 
employers: police and fire departments. 
1. Clinkscale v. City of Philadelphia 
Clinkscale v. City of Philadelphia153 represents a case in which a 
broad criminal records exclusionary policy operated in a particularly 
unfair manner and yet was accepted due to a public safety business 
justification.154 
The plaintiff in Clinkscale was an African-American male and an 
employee of the FBI who sought a position as a police officer with the 
Philadelphia Police Department.155  At the time of his application, he 
had two prior arrests on his record, the first for assaulting a neighbor 
and the second for assaulting a police officer.156  The charges regarding 
the neighbor were dismissed, and Clinkscale was acquitted on the 
charges regarding the police officer.157  In fact, he had filed a lawsuit 
against the police department over the latter charges, and the city had 
settled with the plaintiff.158  His record was expunged.159  
Clinkscale argued that the police department’s policy of denying 
applicants to the police academy on the basis of prior arrests had a 
disparate impact on African-Americans.160  However, the court held that 
the department’s policy was justified, even in light of the fact that the 
plaintiff was likely innocent of his prior charges.161  The court noted that, 
in other cases, dropped charges may not be the result of innocence and 
 
153.  No. 97-2165, 1998 WL 372138 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 1998). 
154.  Id. at *3. 
155.  Id. at *1. 
156.  Id.  
157.  Id. at *2. 
158.  Id. at *1–2. 
159.  Id. at *2. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. at *3. 
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further opined that “[e]ven an unjustified arrest may be indicative of 
character traits that would be undesirable in a police officer, such as a 
quick temper, poor attitude or argumentativeness.”162  The court 
rejected other cases that the plaintiff offered to support his view that 
broad exclusionary policies violate Title VII specifically because none of 
those cases involved the position of police officer.163  
2. Foxworth v. Pennsylvania State Police 
A more recent police department case, Foxworth v. Pennsylvania 
State Police,164 was also decided in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
and the court applied the same reasoning as in Clinkscale.  Foxworth 
addressed the Pennsylvania State Police’s “automatic disqualification 
factors” for the hiring of police cadets.165  At the time of Foxworth’s 
application, a cadet applicant could be disqualified for past criminal 
behavior, regardless of whether the applicant had been arrested, if that 
behavior could have been charged as a “Misdemeanor–1 or higher.”166 
Foxworth, an African-American male, had committed a theft a few 
years prior to his application that was later expunged through an 
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition.167  Foxworth’s record would 
have been grounds for automatic disqualification, and he argued that 
this policy had a disparate impact on African-Americans.168  The court 
questioned whether Foxworth’s statistics adequately showed that the 
particular policy had a disparate racial impact but stated that, even if 
they did, the policy was justified as “ensuring both public safety and that 
police officers do not disregard, nor are perceived as disregarding, the 
law.”169 
3. Tye v. City of Cincinnati 
Another case that accepted a business necessity of “public safety” 
with very little analysis was Tye v. City of Cincinnati.170  In that case, a 
fire department used hiring practices that, among other things, included 
 
162.  Id. at *3. 
163.  Id. 
164.  402 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
165.  Id. at 528. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at 527–28. 
168.  Id. at 534. 
169.  Id. at 534–36. 
170.  794 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
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a criminal background check.171  Five black applicants applied to be fire 
recruits with the Cincinnati Fire Division during the 1985–1987 hiring 
season and were denied.172  During that same period, the background 
check eliminated 60% of black applicants and 30% of white 
applicants.173  
The court found that the background checks had a disparate impact 
on minorities but accepted the fire department’s proffered business 
necessity—public safety.174  In fact, the court specifically noted that “a 
public employer hiring a firefighter is held to a lighter burden in 
demonstrating that its employment criteria is job-related, because of the 
potential risk to public safety of hiring incompetent firefighters.”175  
While it is important to note that this case employed the lower burden 
on employers enunciated in Wards Cove,176 the court’s direct statement 
that employers ought to be held to a lighter burden when questions of 
public safety are in play is further evidence that employers who can 
reasonably assert a business necessity centered in public safety will have 
an easier time winning these types of cases.177 
C. Evidence of Hostility  
The cases that seem to provide evidence of actual hostility on the 
part of the courts toward the use of disparate impact theory in criminal 
records exclusionary cases are those in which the employer has 
implemented some measures to tailor their exclusionary policy to the 
job in question, regardless of whether public safety is implicated.178  This 
makes sense.  If the hostility arises from a general sense that it is unfair 
to require employers to hire people with criminal histories just because 
they are members of a protected class, such concerns will be most 
 
171.  Id. at 827–28. 
172.  Id. at 826. 
173.  Id. at 829. 
174.  Id. at 833. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id.  The court, citing Wards Cove, noted that only the burden of production, but 
not of persuasion, shifts to the employer once the employee has made a prima facie case.  Id. 
(citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989)).  The court did not 
discuss why it used the Wards Cove standard even though the case was decided after the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 had been enacted, abrogating Wards Cove on this point.  Presumably, this 
was because the Wards Cove standard was still in place when the suit was first filed. 
177.  See Tye, 794 F. Supp. at 833. 
178.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013); EEOC v. Carolina 
Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989).  See also infra Part IV.C. 
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apparent in cases in which the employer has already made some effort 
to ensure that the exclusions are job-related.  While not every case that 
is decided in favor of the employer under these circumstances shows 
evidence of hostility,179 because the sense of hostility is one of the main 
critiques of the use of disparate impact theory,180 I focus in this section 
on two cases that do not seem to hide the disdain that some judges feel 
toward the implementation of this theory in this context. 
1. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. 
The opinion in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,181 the case 
quoted at the start of this Article, provides an example of undeniable 
hostility to the use of disparate impact theory in criminal records 
exclusionary cases.  Carolina Freight had a prior-criminal-records policy 
which, among other things, barred employment for anyone convicted of 
a felony, theft, or larceny that resulted in a prison or jail sentence.182  
Francisco Rios, a Hispanic man, had two prior convictions: one from 
1968 for receiving stolen property, which resulted in a sentence of 
probation, and the second in 1969 for felony larceny, which resulted in a 
sentence of twenty-four to sixty months in prison, of which he served 
eighteen.183  In 1980, he began working as a “casual truck driver” for 
Carolina Freight; he had disclosed his prior convictions during a 
polygraph at that time.184  
Rios had a good record while employed with Carolina Freight.185  In 
1983, he was put up for consideration for a promotion to regular 
employee at the company’s Fort Lauderdale terminal.186  Casual 
employees did all of the same work as regular employees but did not 
 
179.  See, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 1283, 1302–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(holding that the plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case of disparate impact because 
they failed to isolate a particular employment practice that caused a disparity); see also, e.g., 
Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 
(W.D. Mo. 2008) (upholding an employee’s termination for a prior rape conviction that was 
justified based on concerns about co-worker morale).  While both of these cases were decided 
in favor of the defendant, neither case indicated any particular hostility to the use of disparate 
impact theory in criminal records cases. 
180.  See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
181.  723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
182.  Id. at 737–38. 
183.  Id. at 737. 
184.  Id. at 738–39. 
185.  Id. at 739. 
186.  Id. at 740. 
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have certain fringe benefits and were not guaranteed a forty-hour work 
week.187  On his application for promotion, Rios did not indicate his 
prior convictions.188  In updating his personnel file for promotion, a 
Carolina Freight employee discovered the first polygraph test revealing 
the convictions and decided he was disqualified for the regular position 
due to his prior convictions.189  Rios’s supervisor put him up for the 
position again in 1984, and he was again rejected.190  There was no 
evidence in the record indicating that anyone hired for the regular 
positions did not meet the conviction policy standards.191  Rios filed a 
discrimination suit and was subsequently fired.192 
The EEOC filed suit on behalf of Rios challenging the portion of 
Carolina Freight’s policy barring from employment anyone with a 
felony, larceny, or theft conviction that resulted in an active prison or 
jail sentence.193  As evidence, the EEOC submitted a labor market 
analysis and a report showing that Hispanics were more likely than 
whites to have been sentenced to prison terms.194 
The court did find that Hispanics are convicted of theft at higher 
rates than whites and that conviction policies like the one at issue in 
Carolina Freight therefore adversely impact Hispanics.195  However, the 
court found that the EEOC failed to prove there was a significant 
imbalance at the Fort Lauderdale terminal or that any alleged 
imbalance was caused by the policy, noting that the EEOC failed to 
adequately define the relevant labor market.196  The court also said that 
the EEOC should have examined “applicant flow data,”197 even though 
it acknowledged earlier that such data was unavailable.198 
Relying on the later-abrogated Wards Cove,199 the court said that 
 
187.  Id. 
188.  Id. at 740–41. 
189.  Id. at 741. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. at 741–42. 
193.  Id. at 742. 
194.  Id. at 742–46. 
195.  Id. at 751. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. 
198.  Id. at 742. 
199.  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991), as recognized in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  
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Carolina Freight’s purported business necessity—to reduce employee 
theft—was sufficient because it “serves, in a significant way, the 
legitimate employment goals of the employer.”200  More telling, the 
court opined that the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Green,201 which could 
be read to bar all conviction policies, was “ill founded,” stating that 
“[t]he plaintiff’s position that minorities should be held to lower 
standards is an insult to millions of honest Hispanics.”202  In a 
particularly sarcastic aside, the court said that “[a]lthough [it] rejoices 
along with the angels of God for every sinner that repents, to say that an 
applicant’s honest character is irrelevant to an employer’s hiring 
decision is ludicrous.”203  Instead, an employer may refuse to hire ex-
felons even though it has a disparate impact on minorities because “[t]o 
hold otherwise is to stigmatize minorities by saying, in effect, your group 
is not as honest as other groups.”204 
The EEOC asserted that a time limit on conviction consideration 
would be a less discriminatory alternative.205  However, because they did 
not offer evidence to prove that this would be equally effective or have 
less of an impact on Hispanic truck drivers, the court did not accept this 
rebuttal.206  The court also found the policy adequate because it only 
barred “applicants who are convicted of a theft crime involving an active 
prison sentence,” and that “[e]mployees are not penalized for mere 
arrests or commission of non-theft felonies.”207  The court ended its 
discussion on the disparate impact issue noting that that even if the 
disparate impact argument were true, “the lesson is not to lower the 
employer’s standards, but to raise the qualifications of Hispanics 
applying for jobs.”208 
In short, the Carolina Freight court expressed what could be read as 
annoyance at the very idea that the policy in question could not be 
justified by business necessity.  Furthermore, it did so under the guise of 
protecting minorities, showing a particular concern that challenges to 
 
200.  Carolina Freight, 723 F. Supp. at 752 (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
201.  Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). 
202.  Carolina Freight, 723 F. Supp. at 752. 
203.  Id. at 752–53. 
204.  Id. at 753. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Id. 
207.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
208.  Id. at 754. 
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such policies based on their racially discriminatory impact denigrates 
other members of the minority group. 
2. EEOC v. Freeman  
Another example of hostility, in at least some courts, to disparate 
impact cases based on criminal records exclusion policies can be found 
in a very recent case in the federal district court in Maryland, EEOC v. 
Freeman.209  In Freeman, the EEOC challenged the defendant’s credit-
check policy as having a disparate impact on African-Americans and its 
criminal background check policy as having a disparate impact on 
African-Americans and males.210  Although the court ultimately granted 
summary judgment on the basis of inadequate statistics,211 the court’s 
hostility to the very nature of the claim was evident from the opening 
paragraph of the opinion.  The opinion opens with commentary on the 
virtues of criminal history and credit record background checks and 
notes that the reasons for such checks are “obvious.”212 
The court’s hostility to the EEOC as a body is also evident from the 
outset.  In an unusual aside, the court noted that “[t]he present case is 
only one of a series of actions recently brought by the EEOC against 
employers who rely on criminal background and/or credit history checks 
in making hiring decisions.”213  The court also seems to be accusing the 
EEOC of hypocrisy, noting that “even the EEOC conducts criminal 
background investigations as a condition of employment for all 
employees, and conducts credit background checks on approximately 90 
percent of its positions.”214 
The opinion’s attacks on the EEOC’s expert witness in the case 
seem particularly uncouth.  At various times, words and phrases used to 
describe the expert, his results, and his methods include the following: 
“an egregious example of scientific dishonesty,”215 “mind-boggling 
number of errors,”216 and “laughable.”217  He is portrayed as a bumbling 
fool, with unnecessary asides such as “[a]mazingly, despite his claims of 
 
209.  961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013). 
210.  Id. at 786, 789. 
211.  Id. at 786–87, 799. 
212.  Id. at 785. 
213.  Id. at 786. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id. at 795. 
216.  Id. at 796. 
217.  Id. 
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doing so”218 and “[f]inally, [the expert] once again managed to introduce 
fresh errors into his new analysis.”219  The court seems to stop just short 
of calling the man stupid.  Conversely, Freeman is described as a 
“family-owned company” (albeit one “with annual revenues exceeding 
$1.3 billion”) whose policies are rational and legitimate.220 
Finally, the opinion ends with a warning to employers.  The court 
states,  
Indeed, any rational employer in the United States should 
pause to consider the implications of actions of this nature 
brought based upon such inadequate data.  By bringing actions 
of this nature, the EEOC has placed many employers in the 
“Hobson’s choice” of ignoring criminal history and credit 
background, thus exposing themselves to potential liability for 
criminal and fraudulent acts committed by employees, on the 
one hand, or incurring the wrath of the EEOC for having utilized 
information deemed fundamental by most employers.221 
The court reiterated the need for tailored, reliable statistics and then 
said, “To require less, would be to condemn the use of common sense, 
and this is simply not what the discrimination laws of this country 
require.”222 
D. Promising Steps: El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority  
While Green remains the seminal case on the use of disparate impact 
theory to challenge criminal records exclusion policies,223 a more recent 
case, El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,224 may 
prove more influential in the coming years.  A close reading of the case 
indicates that it could actually herald a new era of holding employers to 
a higher standard in asserting their business necessity defenses.225  
 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. 
220.  See id. at 785, 787. 
221.  Id. at 803. 
222.  Id.  
223.  Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). 
224.  479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007). 
225.  Hickox & Roehling, supra note 44, at 255 (“[T]he El court comes closer than some 
previous decisions in requiring that employers establish the relevance of applicants’ criminal 
histories.”).  
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Indeed, the EEOC’s new guidelines can be viewed in part as a response 
to what it viewed as a request for clarification from the El court.226 
In El, the plaintiff, Douglas El, had been hired by King Paratransit 
Services, Inc., a sub-contractor of SEPTA, to drive a bus providing 
transportation services to people with mental and physical disabilities.227  
A criminal background check turned up that El had a forty-year-old 
conviction for second-degree murder, which had occurred when El was 
fifteen years old and for which he had served three-and-a-half years.228  
Although El had disclosed the conviction at the time of his application, 
King had not noticed it until receiving the results of El’s criminal 
background check.229  At that time, King terminated El’s employment.230 
At the time of El’s hiring, SEPTA had a policy barring employment 
for anyone convicted of driving under the influence, of a felony or 
misdemeanor for a crime of moral turpitude, or of a violent crime.231  
SEPTA also barred employment for other offenses if they had occurred 
within the seven years prior to employment.232  El argued that SEPTA’s 
policy had a disparate impact on black and Hispanic applicants because 
they are more likely to have criminal records than white applicants.233   
While ultimately deciding in favor of the employer, the El court 
made a number of important observations in its holding that indicate an 
openness to these types of cases.  First, it noted that an employer’s 
proffered “business necessity” defense requires some level of empirical 
proof, rather than mere “‘common-sense’-based assertions.”234  This 
signals a discomfort with the near-automatic credence given to 
employers asserting safety concerns in some other cases.  Next, the court 
also reaffirmed that “more is better” justifications—e.g., the idea that, if 
a given quality was necessary to the performance of a job, then a policy 
purporting to select employees who have “more” of that quality is 
legitimate—did not meet the standards of the business necessity 
defense.235  This is important because it calls into question the notion 
 
226.  EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 11–12. 
227.  El, 479 F.3d at 235. 
228.  Id. at 235–36. 
229.  Id. at 235 n.2. 
230.  Id. at 235. 
231.  Id. at 236. 
232.  Id. 
233.  Id. at 236–37. 
234.  Id. at 240. 
235.  Id. 
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that employers can over-exclude those with some type of criminal 
history based solely on the idea that those without criminal histories will 
generally present the least amount of risk, regardless of whether a given 
applicant’s criminal history bears any cognizable relationship to the job 
in question.   
The El court also noted an important distinction between the hiring 
criteria used in Griggs and other disparate impact cases and the hiring 
criteria at issue when criminal records are considered.236  The court 
noted that in most cases, the hiring criteria at issue is alleged to measure 
an applicant’s actual ability to perform the job in question.237  However, 
in criminal records cases, the policy is not meant to measure one’s 
ability to perform the job; indeed, no one alleged that El’s prior 
convictions made him unable to drive a bus safely or effectively.238  
Rather, the policy measures “risk,” in this case, whether applicants with 
criminal histories are more likely to pose a risk to the passengers they 
are transporting.239  The court noted that the standard it typically applies 
in test-score cases—whether the policy measures “minimum 
qualifications necessary for successful performance of the job in 
question”—was “awkward” in the criminal records context because “it 
is hard to articulate the minimum qualification for posing a low risk of 
attacking someone.”240 
The El court also distinguished Green, noting that, in that case, the 
job in question was an office job and “did not require the employee to 
be alone with and in close proximity to vulnerable members of 
society.”241  It also noted that the policy in Green was a broad ban on 
hiring those with criminal records regardless of how relevant the 
conviction was, whereas the policy at issue in El was more narrowly 
tailored to prevent an employer from hiring only “those that it argues 
have the highest and most unpredictable rates of recidivism and thus 
present the greatest danger to its passengers.”242   
 
236.  Compare id. at 240–43, with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–29 
(1971). 
237.  El, 479 F.3d at 242. 
238.  Id. at 242–243. 
239.  Id. 
240.  Id. at 243 (quoting Lanning v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
241.  Compare id., with Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1292–93 (8th Cir. 
1975). 
242.  Compare El, 479 F.3d at 243, with Green, 523 F.2d at 1298. 
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Given the lack of on-point authority, the El court applied its own 
standard from prior cases, holding that policies must “accurately 
distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk 
and those that do not.”243  Rejecting El’s contention that all bright-line 
policies were prohibited, the court held that “[i]f a bright-line policy can 
distinguish between individual applicants that do and do not pose an 
unacceptable level of risk, then such a policy is consistent with business 
necessity.”244  While this may seem to lean against plaintiffs, given other 
courts’ leniency in public safety cases, the fact that the El court 
attempted to create a standard at all in such cases indicates a desire to 
put at least a little more onus on the employer in defending such 
policies. 
In El, SEPTA argued that its policy was consistent with business 
necessity because  
(1) the job of a paratransit driver requires that the driver be in 
very close contact with passengers, (2) the job requires that the 
driver often be alone with passengers, (3) paratransit passengers 
are vulnerable because they typically have physical and/or 
mental disabilities, (4) disabled people are disproportionately 
targeted by sexual and violent criminals, (5) violent criminals 
recidivate at a high rate, (6) it is impossible to predict with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy which criminals will recidivate, (7) 
someone with a conviction for a violent crime is more likely than 
someone without one to commit a future violent crime 
irrespective of how remote in time the conviction is, and (8) 
SEPTA’s policy is the most accurate way to screen out applicants 
who present an unacceptable risk.245 
The court noted that a bright-line policy could be justified if SEPTA 
could show that someone with a violent conviction would always pose a 
“materially higher risk” than someone without.246  It noted that to prove 
this, SEPTA could show that “other factors—such as age at conviction, 
the number of violent convictions, and/or the remoteness of that 
conviction—are unreliable or otherwise fail to reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level.”247  By putting this burden on the employer, El 
 
243.  El, 479 F.3d at 245. 
244.  Id. 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id. at 245–46. 
247.  Id. at 246. 
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indicates that such factors should be tied directly into the business 
necessity defense as opposed to being shouldered by the plaintiff in an 
attempt to prove that there is a less discriminatory alternative that the 
employer could have adopted. 
The court ultimately relied on SEPTA’s presentation of expert 
testimony that, regardless of the passage of time, someone with a prior 
conviction for a violent crime will never be “less or equally likely” to 
commit a violent act than someone who had never done so.248  The court 
noted that, because the plaintiff had presented no evidence to rebut this 
testimony, it must “take [the expert] at his word.”249  Another SEPTA-
provided expert testified that the mentally and physically disabled are 
more likely than other groups to be the victims of violent or sexual 
crime and that “employees of transportation providers commit a 
disproportionate share of those crimes against disabled people.”250  The 
court noted that El’s decision not to depose the experts or to present 
conflicting expert testimony ultimately proved “fatal” to his case.251   
Thus, in spite of the fact that the court ultimately held in favor of the 
employer, the El court indicated no hostility toward the use of disparate 
impact theory to challenge criminal records policies.  Instead, the court 
presented a thoughtful and balanced analysis of the issue and attempted 
to move some of the burden back on the employer.252  The main 
difficulty remaining for plaintiffs after El is the difficulty of obtaining 
the type of statistical evidence that could help to rebut employers’ 
proffered business necessities.253  This is a problem faced by disparate 
impact plaintiffs generally, but it does present particular challenges to 
employees in criminal-records-exclusion cases due to the lack of on-
point research showing the likelihood or lack thereof that someone who 
committed a crime in the past will do so again and, in particular, will do 
so on the job.  Nonetheless, the El court’s assertion that the employer 
bears the burden of showing that more-tailored policies would not work 
as well may indicate some measure of relief for plaintiffs.254 
 
248.  Id. 
249.  Id. 
250.  Id. at 247. 
251.  Id. 
252.  Id. at 248. 
253.  See id. at 247. 
254.  See id. at 240, 249. 
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V. OTHER CRITIQUES OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY 
 While the most salient critique of the use of disparate impact 
theory in criminal records cases is that courts are hostile to these types 
of claims, it is important to look at other critiques that have been leveled 
as well.  These critiques come from both sides of the spectrum, those 
that indicate concern for the plaintiffs and those that indicate concern 
for the defendants.255  Nonetheless, regardless of motivation, the 
critiques share many overlapping themes.  In this section, I address four 
main criticisms of the uses of disparate impact theory in criminal records 
cases. 
A. Creating a New Protected Class 
Some critics have argued that using disparate impact theory to 
protect those with criminal convictions essentially amounts to creating a 
new protected class.256  Indeed, this critique was made as early as the 
dissent in Green.257  The dissent in that case noted, “In effect, the 
present case has judicially created a new Title VII protected class—
persons with conviction records.  This extension, if wise, is a legislative 
responsibility and should not be done under the guise of racial 
discrimination.”258 
The obvious response to this critique is that it could be made of 
virtually every use of disparate impact theory.  By its very nature, 
disparate impact protects only a subset of individuals within a protected 
class: women under a certain height or weight,259 for example, or 
African-Americans who do not have high school diplomas.260  To state 
that applying disparate impact theory in the context of criminal 
convictions is to protect only those African-American and Hispanic men 
who have criminal records is to state the obvious. 
 
255.  See supra note 70. 
256.  Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 4 (accusing the EEOC of creating a new protected 
class of former criminals “under the pretext of preventing racial discrimination”). 
257.  Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1300 (8th Cir. 1975) (Gibson, C.J., 
dissenting from Order Denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc).   
258.  Id. 
259.  See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (holding that a prison’s 
minimum height and weight restrictions for prison guards violated Title VII because of the 
restrictions’ disparate impact on women). 
260.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that a facially neutral 
policy requiring employees for certain positions to have high school diplomas and pass 
intelligence tests violated Title VII because of its disparate impact on African-Americans). 
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Nonetheless, there does seem to be something qualitatively different 
about the application of disparate impact theory to those with criminal 
records versus, say, those who fail to perform well on a test.  This 
difference was noted by the court in El v. SEPTA in its discussion of the 
business necessity defense to disparate impact.261  The court pointed out 
that the typical assessment of the business necessity defense involves 
evaluating whether a given policy or practice is related enough to the 
ability to perform the job at hand to justify its disparate impact.262  While 
this is rarely a simple process, there is often at least an element of 
measurability in making the determination.  For example, there are 
extensive testing validation requirements that make it easier to 
determine if a given test truly measures job performance. 263 
In contrast, typical business necessities proffered in criminal 
convictions cases rest on general concerns for hard-to-measure qualities 
like safety,264 loss prevention,265 and employee morale.266  Such qualities 
are hard to measure with any accuracy.  While there are some studies 
indicating that former criminals are no more likely to commit further 
crimes than those without criminal histories, such studies are sparse.267  
On the other hand, studies indicating the opposite may also not be 
useful because they do not account for the key question: Whether those 
with prior criminal histories are more likely to commit further crimes at 
work.268  General figures on recidivism are not useful in this context 
because they fail to account for the fact that one of the chief causes of 
recidivism is a lack of employment opportunity.269  Therefore, business 
necessity arguments that rest on general recidivism figures simply beg 
the question; the very propensity that is used to prevent people from 
obtaining employment would likely be alleviated if the individual could 
 
261.  El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242–45 (3d Cir. 2007). 
262.  Id. at 242. 
263.  See generally 29 C.F.R. pt. 1607 (2014) 
264.  See, e.g., El, 479 F.3d at 242–43; see also supra Part IV.D. 
265.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 754 (S.D. Fla. 
1989); see also supra Part IV.C.1. 
266.  See, e.g., Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. 
Supp. 2d 1028, 1031 (W.D. Mo. 2008); see also supra note 179. 
267.  See, e.g., Kurlychek et al., supra note 47.  
268.  Hickox & Roehling, supra note 44, at 207 (“There is surprisingly little research 
examining the relationship between a criminal record and the propensity to commit 
workplace crimes or engage in inappropriate workplace behavior.”). 
269.  See Simonson, supra note 46, at 284; see also Archer & Williams, supra note 31, at 
52930.  
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obtain employment. 
To navigate these murky waters, it may be best to turn to the 
original purpose of both Title VII and disparate impact theory.  Two 
key lines of thought help to clarify this matter.  First, Title VII aims to 
eradicate employment discrimination via two avenues: equal 
opportunity and equal effects.270  Disparate impact theory arose out of 
the idea that simply opening doors was not enough.271  Instead, to have 
teeth, employment discrimination law also needed to address 
employment practices that, while seemingly opening doors, in essence 
provided keys to only part of the population.272  There was a general 
recognition that dispensing with facially discriminatory policies and 
practices would mean little if neutral practices simply operated to 
perpetuate the same results.273 
The other key line of thought underlying Title VII that bears a 
particularly close relationship to the development of disparate impact 
theory is that Title VII is ultimately aimed at protecting individuals not 
classes.  This focus on individuals has been reiterated time and again in 
Title VII cases.274  In spite of the fact that disparate impact theory seems 
to inherently protect based on group status, there is the same underlying 
current of individual protection that can be found in disparate treatment 
cases.275  Both theories rest on the notion that individuals ought not to 
be stereotyped based on their membership in a protected class.276  The 
key difference seems to be that, while disparate treatment often shows a 
particular concern for those who do not possess the stereotyped 
characteristic,277 disparate impact offers protection for those who 
 
270.  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (“The objective of 
Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable 
group of white employees over other employees.”). 
271.  See id.; Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645–46 (1989). 
272.  See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30. 
273.  Id. 
274.  See, e.g., City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705, 707–
08 (1978) (holding that an employer’s pension plan that required women to make larger 
contributions than men based on actuarial data that women tend to live longer and thus 
receive greater benefits from the pension plan violated Title VII because, while women as a 
class live longer than men, this may not be true for individual women). 
275.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
276.  See Simonson, supra note 46, at 284–87. 
277.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (holding that adverse employment 
actions predicated on stereotypes about the appropriate behavior of women amounts to sex 
discrimination). 
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actually possess it.278  Therefore, it protects individuals precisely because 
they share commonalities with others in their class by asking whether 
these commonalities are reasonable bars to particular employment 
opportunities. 
These twin purposes of Title VII and disparate impact theory help to 
put the “creating a new protected class” argument in context.  On their 
face, criminal records policies do not seem to interfere with either equal 
opportunity or equal effects in their traditional sense because the 
characteristic that is being screened for is one that the person possessing 
the characteristic voluntarily took on.279  However, once one commits a 
crime, that record stays with the person forever, so a criminal history 
essentially becomes an immutable characteristic as unsheddable as one’s 
race.280  That being the case, the purpose of Title VII to protect 
individuals takes on new dimensions.  Given this context, like in other 
disparate impact cases, individual members of protected classes must be 
given individual consideration precisely because they share a given trait 
in addition to their membership in the protected class. 
Protecting individuals because of a trait that they share with a 
number of members of their protected class does not, then, create a new 
protected class based on the trait.  Instead, individuals gain protection 
since they share that trait precisely because they are a member of the 
protected class.  The sense that a new protected class is being created 
results from the fact that not all members of the protected class share 
the trait.  Nonetheless, this is true of virtually all disparate impact 
 
278.  See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451–52 (1982) (rejecting the “bottom-
line” defense to disparate impact, which asserted that a practice with disparate impact on a 
protected group should be allowed so long as an employer took later remedial efforts to 
eradicate the disparity, because such a defense fails to fully protect those individuals who are 
screened out by the practice). 
279.  See Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional 
Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 
7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 59 (2005) (noting that “[u]nderlying much of the Court’s equal protection 
analysis is a concern that people should not be penalized for characteristics that they did not 
choose and cannot change” and distinguishing the former from the latter using the related 
concept of “accountability”).  While the same could be said of religion and pregnancy, the 
only other protected statuses in Title VII that can unquestionably be seen as matters of 
personal choice, it is well-established that the extremely personal nature of religious choices 
and the choice to become a parent make them more akin to in-born characteristics like race 
and sex than to other types of personal choices. 
280.  Id. at 63 (arguing that those with criminal records share many characteristics with 
other protected classes under the Equal Protection Clause and noting that unless reforms 
such as the expanded use of expungement are implemented, “criminal records will remain 
largely immutable”). 
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cases.281  If all members of a protected class shared the trait, then there 
would be no need for disparate impact because such cases would 
amount to facially discriminatory policies that would be covered by 
disparate treatment.282 
B. Risk of Validating Negative Stereotypes 
While the analysis in the previous section defeats the argument that 
the EEOC is attempting to create a new protected class of those with 
criminal convictions, it brings up another concern.  Saying that 
individuals gain protection since they share a trait precisely because of 
their membership in a protected class sounds innocuous when one is 
discussing, say, women under a certain height.283  It is decidedly more 
problematic when stating that African-American and Hispanic men 
have more criminal convictions precisely because they are African-
American and Hispanic. 
It is well established that minority men, particularly African-
American men, suffer from multiple stereotypes associated with both 
their race and sex.284  Studies show that there is a strong and prevalent 
association of African-American men with criminality.285  Indeed, at 
least one scholar has argued that measures aimed at protecting African-
American men with criminal records may have a negative effect on 
African-Americans without criminal records; the idea is that if 
employers cannot screen based on criminal records, then they may 
screen for proxies of criminality, and given the association of African-
American men with criminality, such unconscious bias will result in 
more African-American men without criminal records being screened 
from employment.286 
 
281.  See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text. 
282.  See supra note 274. 
283.  See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (holding that a prison’s 
minimum height and weight restrictions for prison guards violated Title VII because of the 
restrictions’ disparate impact on women). 
284.  See David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist 
Myth of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 174 (2009) (“African-American males have been 
viewed as oversexed, dangerous, and threatening.”). 
285.  Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Valerie J. Purdie, Phillip Atiba Goff & Paul G. Davies, 
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 
876 (2004). 
286.  Michael A. Stoll, Ex-Offenders, Criminal Background Checks, and Racial 
Consequences in the Labor Market, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 406 (arguing that more 
limited use of criminal background checks could result in greater discrimination against non-
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Nonetheless, when one takes a step back from the employment 
context, it is clear that the association of minority men with criminality 
has severe effects on that community that do not begin with the 
rejection from employment opportunities.  Such an association is very 
likely both a cause and an effect of the disproportionate number of 
African-American and Hispanic men who are involved in the criminal 
justice system.287  The association may be a factor in causing the 
disproportionality by affecting both the types of laws that are 
implemented and, more importantly, how they are enforced.288  In other 
words, the disproportionate number of African-American and Hispanic 
men who have encounters with the criminal justice system is very likely 
at least partially caused by preexisting biases about their propensity to 
commit crime.289  They are both more likely to be arrested and more 
likely to be convicted, regardless of the severity of the crime.290  Once 
this occurs, the disproportionate numbers then reinforce the stereotype 
that African-American men and Hispanic men are more likely to 
engage in criminal activity.  
Thus, “protecting” African-American men and Hispanic men who 
do not have criminal records seems like a hollow reason for rejecting the 
protection of those who do.  It takes attention away from the inequities 
in the criminal justice system and, indeed, implies that there are no 
inequities.  The underlying implication is that the criminal justice system 
 
offenders “who are members of social groups that are disproportionately represented by ex-
offenders, such as African Americans”). 
287.  See, e.g., Jacqueline Johnson, Mass Incarceration: A Contemporary Mechanism of 
Racialization in the United States, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 301, 317 (2011–2012) (“Incarceration 
containerizes, legitimizes, and grounds perceptions associating race with criminality.”); 
Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
191, 218 (1998) (“[T]he stereotyping of African Americans as criminals affects how law 
enforcement agents relate to African Americans and how African Americans in turn relate to 
them.”); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the 
“War on Drugs” was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 381 (2002) 
(“Throughout the drug war, African Americans have been disproportionately investigated, 
detained, searched, arrested and charged with the use, possession and sale of illegal drugs.”). 
288.  See Meares, supra note 287, at 218 (discussing the racialized nature of drug laws 
and enforcement). 
289.  See Simonson, supra note 46, at 284–85. 
290.  Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 963, 967–68 (2013) (“From encounters with law enforcement officers on our 
nation’s streets, roads and highways, to arrest, to charging decisions (including youth charged 
as adults) to sentencing and to incarceration, poor African-Americans and Latinos are 
disproportionately injected into the criminal justice system and remain stuck in it.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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acts as a fair measure of who is “deserving” and “not deserving” of 
protection.  Whether it is the job of employment discrimination law to 
attempt to rectify these inequities is an important but separate question.  
Although the prevailing attitude is that employment discrimination law 
is not the proper venue for addressing societal discrimination,291 it is 
nonetheless true that in many instances it operates to do just that.  
Griggs itself relied heavily on the fact that African-American men had 
been victims of a poor education system that caused them to 
underperform on intelligence tests.292  Thus, from the start, disparate 
impact theory has, at least to some extent, attempted to alleviate the 
effects of societal discrimination, whatever the disclaimers that have 
since been promulgated. 
Furthermore, as a philosophical matter, justifying the negative 
treatment of one “less deserving” segment of a group by reference to 
the possible consequences to the “more deserving” segment is a 
dangerous game.  Such arguments may rest, even if not explicitly, on the 
assumption that discrimination against a certain group is inevitable and, 
that being the case, that it is better to protect at least part of the group 
than to protect the group as a whole.293  Furthermore, it operates to 
justify such discrimination by insinuating that the underlying cause of 
the discrimination, when not motivated by animus, is justified.  This can 
be seen in arguments against affirmative action that rely on the negative 
connotations that attach to all members of the affected group regardless 
of whether they were beneficiaries.294  For example, in the education 
context, focusing on the negative perceptions that may attach to 
members of the group who would have been admitted to a given school 
regardless of affirmative action programs may imply that the system of 
 
291.  See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40 (2006) (arguing that an approach to 
discrimination law that accounts for, among other things, unconscious bias “may be asking 
antidiscrimination law to do too much of the work of responding to society’s inequalities”); 
Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer 
Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 851 (2007) (“Current pessimism concerning the political 
viability of a structural approach [to employment discrimination law] . . . stems from the 
assumption that a structural approach aims to impose costs on employers for societal barriers 
to employment.”). 
292.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
293.  See, e.g., Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 3–4. 
294.  Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After 
Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1263 (1998) (discussing arguments against 
affirmative action that center around the idea “that using racial or gender preferences 
reinforces negative stereotypes about minorities and women”). 
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admissions that happens to benefit this group is inherently fair and 
unbiased.  
Additionally, even if one accepts the premise, and it is not hard to 
accept, that minority men without criminal records may face unintended 
negative consequences from the attempt to protect those with criminal 
records, this may open up a new door of liability—disparate treatment.  
Indeed, one of the arguments the attorneys general made in their letter 
attacking the EEOC is that more individualized assessment of 
candidates for employment could lead to increases in disparate 
treatment lawsuits.295  The idea is that if employees are evaluated on an 
individual basis, unconscious bias against minority men will be more 
likely to play out in “forgiving” Caucasian men with criminal records 
while continuing to discriminate against minority men with criminal 
records.296  This may very well be true, but if this is the case, it may 
provide minority men with criminal records with an extra avenue of 
protection.  Currently, it is particularly difficult to prove disparate 
treatment cases when criminal records are involved because it is difficult 
to find an appropriate comparator.297  With individualized consideration, 
minority men with criminal records should be better able to pinpoint 
when Caucasian men with similar negatives on their resume are 
provided with opportunities that they are denied.  
C. Underinclusive 
Another critique levied at the use of disparate impact theory to 
protect minority men with criminal records is that such a use is 
underinclusive.298  This critique is valid precisely because the critique 
that such policies create a new protected class is not.  Title VII disparate 
impact theory will, in most instances, protect only minority men and, in 
particular, African-American and Hispanic men.299  This is because—
precisely because there are a disproportionate number of African-
 
295.  See Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 3–4; see also Stoll, supra note 286, at 406.  
296.  See Stoll, supra note 286, at 406.  
297.  See Harwin, supra note 29, at 17. 
298.  Elizabeth A. Gerlach, Comment, The Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting 
Applicants with Criminal Convictions While Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in 
Hiring, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 981, 984 (2006) (noting that Title VII leaves ex-offenders 
who are not members of a protected class without a remedy).  Another limitation on Title VII 
is that it applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) 
(2012). 
299.  See, e.g., Harwin, supra note 29, at 4–5; Simonson, supra note 46, at 284–85. 
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American and Hispanic men with criminal records—women of all races 
and Caucasian men will find it difficult to prove that criminal records 
policies have a disparate impact on their groups. 
Nonetheless, the fact that Title VII is not a panacea for ending 
discrimination against those with criminal records is not a reason to 
avoid its use in those instances in which it is legitimate and helpful.  The 
real risk is that too much success with Title VII could endanger other 
reforms aimed at assisting in the re-integration of those with criminal 
records generally.300  However, for reasons discussed later in this Article, 
with appropriate caution and distribution of resources, that is unlikely to 
be a problem.301  It is clear that Title VII is only a small part of the 
solution.  Limitations in disparate impact theory as a concept as well as 
judicial acceptance of the theory in criminal records cases indicate that 
other avenues of alleviating discrimination against those with criminal 
records must be pursued. 
D. Fairness to Employers 
A final critique of using disparate impact theory to protect minority 
men is that it is unfair to employers.302  This critique can be divided into 
two threads: First, that individualized consideration of applicants with 
criminal records will be too costly,303 and second, that employers may 
risk liability for negligent hiring.304 
While the possibility of liability for negligent hiring is a real concern, 
it may not be so onerous as those who defend criminal records policies 
claim.305  Such liability typically attaches when an employer fails to 
discover that an employee has a particular type of criminal record that 
should have put the employer on notice that other employees or its 
customer base could be at risk.306  For example, in one case, a janitorial 
contracting service was denied summary judgment on a negligent hiring 
claim when it failed to discover a janitor’s prior record of assaulting a 
 
300.  See, e.g., Concepción, supra note 15, at 249–50. 
301.  See infra Part VI.B. 
302.  Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 4–5. 
303.  Id. 
304.  See Monica Scales, Case Note, Employer Catch-22: The Paradox Between 
Employer Liability for Employee Criminal Acts and the Prohibition Against Ex-Convict 
Discrimination, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 419, 423–24 (2002). 
305.  Connett, supra note 75, at 1062 (“[C]ritics have exaggerated the difficulty of 
simultaneously avoiding disparate impact and negligent hiring liability.”). 
306.  See id. 
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woman, and that employee assaulted a student at the university at which 
the contracting service had placed him.307   
However, the general principle that employers should not 
indiscriminately bar those with criminal records from employment 
would not be implicated in such situations.  Of course an employer 
should avoid hiring someone with a history of sexual assault in positions 
that involve close, unsupervised contact with the very group the 
employee has a history of assaulting.  No one is arguing that child 
molesters ought to have a fair chance at jobs in day cares or that those 
with recent DUIs ought to be hired to drive a school bus.  Individualized 
consideration does not require ignoring obvious unsuitability for a job; 
rather, it requires screening out only those who are obviously 
unsuitable.308  For example, the applicant with a DUI might logically be 
screened from the bus driver position, but it makes far less sense to 
screen him out of the janitor position.  Failure to screen the applicant 
from the bus driving position might give rise to negligent hiring liability, 
but liability would be extraordinarily unlikely in the latter case because, 
assuming there are no driving duties associated with the janitorial 
position, the possession of a prior DUI bears no cognizable relationship 
to the job in question and an employer would not be reasonably 
expected to foresee any potential harm arising from the prior 
conviction. 
Of course, whenever employer liability is implicated, a possible 
result is over-caution on the part of the employer.  It has been argued, 
for example, that hostile environment sexual harassment liability leads 
to over-restriction of speech in an attempt by the employer to avoid 
liability.309  However, the over-caution suggested in allowing unchecked 
use of criminal history in employment decisions is particularly nefarious.  
It would be akin to allowing employers to avoid sexual harassment 
liability by refusing to hire women.  Such extreme measures cannot be 
justified under Title VII because they perpetuate the very 
discrimination that Title VII is aimed at preventing.310   
 
307.  Blair v. Defender Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623 (4th Cir. 2004). 
308.  Connett, supra note 75, at 1062 (“If an employer . . . carefully considers the 
applicant’s prior offense and is unable to find a business necessity basis for denying the job, it 
is unlikely that the hiring decision could be deemed negligent as the risk would not have been 
reasonably foreseeable.”). 
309.  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 
RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 567–69 (1995). 
310.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)–(m) (2012).  An employer could clearly not act in the 
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Arguments have also been made that individualized consideration of 
those with criminal backgrounds will be too costly for the employer.311  
The underlying sentiment is that employers will be forced to interview 
even those people whom they would never actually hire and whom they 
would be justified in not hiring even under the more stringent 
requirements.312  While this may be true in some instances, it is not 
inevitable.  Nothing in the EEOC’s guidelines or in Title VII law 
generally requires employers to interview any more candidates than 
they ordinarily would.313  Instead, if a given candidate is just as qualified 
as or more qualified than another candidate but for his criminal record, 
the employer would have a chance to assess that candidate as an 
individual rather than screening him out up front.  Under those 
circumstances, it is actually beneficial to employers to avoid blind, broad 
screens because they may discover that a given applicant who would 
otherwise have been screened out is actually the best person for the job.  
Furthermore, assuming that those with criminal records have less 
education and job experience than those without criminal records,314 the 
number of people with criminal records who would receive interviews 
may increase only minimally. 
VI. THE BOTTOM LINE: 
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY 
Given the cases and policies that have been discussed throughout 
this Article, the promise and limits of disparate impact theory can be 
broken down into three distinct categories of cases: Those that will 
likely win, those that will likely lose, and those that could win if 
statistical evidence were improved.  Understanding these distinctions is 
important because there is little use in pursuing costly litigation in cases 
that have virtually no chance of success.  In such cases, money would be 
better spent on other avenues of enforcement or policy change. 
A. Cases That Will Likely Succeed 
The EEOC has shown particular concern with broad-based 
 
way described in the example in the sexual harassment case because such an act would be an 
obvious example of disparate treatment on the basis of sex.  See id. 
311.  Morrisey et al., supra note 67, at 4–5. 
312.  Id. 
313.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63. 
314.  See Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 4–5. 
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exclusionary policies.315  Such policies are the most obviously unfair 
because they deny virtually all individual consideration for potential 
employees.  Because of the strong underlying purpose of Title VII to 
protect individuals from the stereotypes of grouping,316 cases involving 
broad bans are very likely to succeed. 
Particularly vulnerable to attack are broad bans barring employment 
to those with only arrest records.  Many legal authorities seem willing to 
recognize that arrest records are qualitatively different from conviction 
records because they do not indicate guilt.317  Broad bans without regard 
to the type of crime committed are also vulnerable because they are 
overinclusive, screening out people whose prior crime has little to 
nothing to do with the job in question.318   
Cases in these categories are very likely to succeed in most 
circumstances.319  One exception is in jobs that entail an inherent 
concern for public safety.  In particular, police departments and fire 
departments appear to be given carte blanche to discriminate based on 
criminal backgrounds, even in cases in which the only mark on the 
applicant is an arrest record.320  While safety is proffered as a business 
necessity in many criminal records cases, courts seem particularly apt to 
accept it with very little question in cases in which the job function, by 
its very nature, is one of protection.321 
B. Cases That Will Likely Fail  
Cases that will likely lose fall into two main categories; the first of 
those categories, jobs that involve public safety, has already been 
discussed.322  The second category involves employers that already take 
 
315.  EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63. 
316.  See, e.g., supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
317.  Equal Opportunity Emp’t Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of 
Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, in MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYMENT LAW SOURCEBOOK & CITATOR 531, 549 
n.101 (Laurence J. Donoghue, David G. Abbott & Paul H. Merry eds., 2013) (“At least 13 
states have statutes explicitly prohibiting arrest record inquiries and/or dissemination subject 
to certain exceptions.”); see also Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); 
supra Part IV.A.2. 
318.  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806–07 (1973); Green 
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297–98 (8th Cir. 1975); see also supra Part IV. 
319.  See supra Part IV.A. 
320.  See supra Part IV.B. 
321.  See supra Part IV.B. 
322.  See supra Part IV.B. 
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into account at least some of the Green factors as articulated by the 
EEOC guidelines.323 
As noted previously, the EEOC guidelines call for an individualized 
assessment of candidates based on such factors as the type of crime in 
question, the number of crimes committed, and the amount of time 
passed since the crime was committed.324  Therefore, broad bans on 
those with criminal records that are nonetheless time-limited and 
tailored to the position in question are likely to survive.   
For the most part, this is as it should be.  As important as the goals 
of re-integration and avoiding racial discrimination are, employers 
ought not to be forced to turn a completely blind eye to criminal 
histories that indicate unsuitability for particular positions.  Thus, 
employers ought not to be barred from excluding from financially 
sensitive positions those with convictions for embezzlement. 
More problematic are cases in which time limitations are accepted, 
in and of themselves, as reasonable bars to employment.  Such policies 
might include situations such as broad bans on anyone who has been 
convicted of any crime in, say, the past three years.  The problem with 
such policies is two-fold.  First, such policies exacerbate recidivism 
because most repeat offenders re-offend within the first few years of 
release.325  If one of the causes of recidivism is a lack of employment 
opportunities, then such people are likely to get caught in a cycle of 
crime that may have been avoided if they had been able to secure 
employment directly after their convictions. 
Second, it is extremely difficult to ensure compliance with such rules.  
Given the easy availability of criminal records that stretch far back into 
the past,326 it seems unlikely that employers would turn a blind eye to 
convictions that fall outside of the allowed time limit.  Such policies rely 
on a kind of honor code that employers will simply stop reading the 
criminal record document once they get to a particular cut-off date.  
While it is certainly possible to request information that goes back only 
so far, it seems nearly impossible to prove, without inside information, 
that an employer complied with such a requirement. 
 
323.  EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 18. 
324.  Id. at 11, 18. 
325.  See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
326.  See Holzer et al., supra note 5, at 9. 
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C. The In-Between Cases 
Cases that could go either way could turn into winning cases if more 
refined statistics were employed.327  Such cases include those in which 
bans are in place for only certain crimes and positions, and those where 
the time utilized in looking backwards at the candidate’s record is not 
sufficiently limited.328 
Plaintiffs in these types of cases would be significantly more likely to 
win with more sophisticated statistical analysis and the employment of 
better expert witnesses.329  Courts will be more likely to decide in a 
plaintiff’s favor if the statistics employed to show a disparity are more 
closely tied to the labor force from which the employers’ candidates are 
drawn.330  In other words, courts are less likely to respond well to 
generalized statistics about the disproportionate number of minority 
men with criminal records across the country.  Instead, courts are 
looking for more specific statistics about the population near the 
employer and about how particular crimes, such as drug crimes, involve 
disproportionate convictions amongst protected classes.331 
Those that do respond to more general statistics tend to take 
disparate impact as a given and focus instead on the business necessity 
defense.332  In such cases, the best line of attack for plaintiffs will be to 
provide expert witness testimony indicating the likelihood or lack 
thereof that those who have previously perpetrated a given crime will do 
 
327.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 798–99 (D. Md. 2013).  As 
discussed supra Part IV.C.2, the court in Freeman was particularly disdainful of what it 
deemed the poor quality of the statistical evidence offered.  Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 798–
99. 
328.  Id. at 787–88; El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 2007). 
329.  See, e.g., El, 479 F.3d 232.  As discussed supra Part IV.D, the court in SEPTA 
relied heavily on the fact that the defendant had presented expert witnesses whose testimony 
the plaintiff did not rebut.  El, 479 F.3d at 246–47.  
330.  For example, a major concern of the court in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers 
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 751 (S.D. Fla. 1989), was the fact that the statistics employed were 
not targeted enough to the population surrounding the Fort Lauderdale plant to which the 
plaintiff had applied or the population who had applied for the position.  See also supra Part 
IV.C.1. 
331.  See, e.g., Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. 
Supp. 2d 1028 (W.D. Mo. 2008); see also supra note 179.  In that case, the court noted that the 
defendant presented only general crime statistics but no statistics indicating that minority 
men would be disparately impacted by policies excluding those who have committed 
particular crimes, in that case, sex offenses.  Fletcher, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1030. 
332.  See, e.g., Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297–99 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Gregory, 316 F. Supp. 401; see also Harwin, supra note 29, at 6–7. 
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so again, particularly on the job.333 
Of course, such statistics and expert witnesses may not be readily 
available.334  Without that information, cases in the in-between category 
are far more likely to fall on the loss side of the spectrum.  Knowing this, 
a more efficient use of resources than immediately pursuing lawsuits 
may be to invest in better social science research.  Such data, while 
costly to obtain up front, would not only increase the chances of winning 
cases in the future, but might also influence some employers to refine 
their own policies by causing them to re-examine their own biases. 
D. A Final Word of Caution 
While this Article ultimately argues that the use of disparate impact 
theory in criminal-records-exclusion cases is both legitimate and, in 
many cases, desirable, it would be unwise to end without noting two 
further points of consideration that must be taken into account when 
evaluating whether this path is the most appropriate or effective in 
addressing the ultimate goal of minimizing the effects of criminal 
records exclusions on the employment opportunities of minority men. 
First, regardless of the legal merits of disparate impact theory, public 
opinion regarding these types of cases ought not to be ignored.335  As 
was noted previously, disparate impact theory, generally, has been 
under attack for several years.336  Most recently, Justice Scalia called the 
very constitutionality of the theory into question.337  Forty years on, 
 
333.  See supra note 329. 
334.  See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text, noting that the court in EEOC v. 
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989), asked for applicant-flow 
statistics in spite of acknowledging that they were unavailable.  723 F. Supp. at 742, 751. 
335.  Much of the public reaction to the new EEOC Guidelines has been negative.  See, 
e.g., James Bovard, Perform Criminal Background Checks at Your Peril, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 
2013, at A15 (“Most businesses perform criminal background checks on job applicants, but 
the EEOC guidance frowns on such checks and creates new legal tripwires that could spark 
federal lawsuits.”); Peter Kirsanow & Carissa Mulder, The EEOC’s New Rule on Background 
Checks, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2013, 7:56 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner
/338937/eeocs-new-rule-background-checks-peter-kirsanow, archived at http://perma.cc/9QG
U-GB5B (“Despite the profound effect the guidance has on the nation’s employers, the 
EEOC hurriedly implemented the guidance without giving the public an adequate 
opportunity to comment on it.”).  But see Editorial, A Second Chance for Ex-Offenders, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 2013, at A26. 
336.  See supra note 74. 
337.  Ricci v. DeStefano 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he war 
between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves 
us to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”). 
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commentators have begun to doubt whether disparate impact theory is 
still needed and whether it is a valid expression of the purposes of Title 
VII now that at least some of the historical discrimination that seemed 
to be its driving force has been alleviated.  The fact of the matter is that 
those with criminal records do not present a sympathetic class.  As the 
rapid and scathing backlash against the EEOC’s release of its new 
enforcement guidelines shows,338 too much attention in this area could 
risk undermining the theory of disparate impact as a whole. 
Second, in spite of the promise of using disparate impact theory in 
criminal-records-exclusion cases, it remains a somewhat awkward fit, 
with far too many opportunities for individuals to fall through the 
cracks.  While federal law remains inadequate to the task of providing 
broader employment protections to those with criminal records, it may 
make more sense to focus reform efforts at the state and local levels 
where there has been much more progress.339  Stronger and more 
pervasive state laws would likely offer more protection, and more 
quickly, while having the side effect of bolstering support for broader 
federal reforms by providing incubators to test out new policies and 
laws. 
Nonetheless, in spite of these words of caution, a more concerted 
effort to enforce Title VII against those criminal records policies to 
which it applies is a welcome goal.  So long as resources are focused on 
those cases with higher chances of winning, greater enforcement should 
ultimately strengthen and increase the impact of Title VII. 
 
338.  See supra notes 67, 335.  
339.  See Concepción, supra note 15, at 249–50 & nn.146–55. 
